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Abstract: 
The hierarchical competing systems model (HCSM) provides a framework for understanding the emergence 
and early development of executive function – the cognitive processes underlying the conscious control of 
behavior – in the context of search for hidden objects. According to this model, behavior is determined by the 
joint influence of a developmentally invariant habit system and a conscious representational system that 
becomes increasingly influential as children develop. This article describes a computational formalization of the 
HCSM, reviews behavioral and computational research consistent with the model, and suggests directions for 




The term executive function refers to the cognitive processes involved in goal-directed problem solving – 
processes such as working memory, inhibitory control, and error correction. Research on executive function 
indicates that it emerges in infancy and continues to develop well into adolescence (see Diamond, 2002, and 
Zelazo, Carlson & Kesek, 2008, for reviews). Much of the recent research on the development of executive 
function, however, has focused on the marked changes occurring between about 3 and 5 years of age (e.g. 
Carlson, 2005; Kirkham, Cruess & Diamond, 2003; Espy, 1997; Munakata & Yerys, 2001; Zelazo, Müller, Frye 
& Marcovitch, 2003) – changes that are correlated with key aspects of self-and social-understanding (i.e. theory 
of mind) in both typically and atypically developing children (Perner & Lang, 1999). These changes have been 
observed, for example, on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (Zelazo et al., 2003), the ‘Less is More’ task 
(Carlson, Davis & Leach, 2005), and the Day-Night Stroop Task (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994); on all of 
these tasks, 3-yearolds perform poorly, whereas 5-year-olds perform well. Experimental investigations using 
these tasks have supported the formulation of detailed theories of the mechanisms underlying executive function 
and its development in this age range, and these theories have informed our understanding of executive function 
in general. 
 
In contrast to the burgeoning literature on executive function in preschool age children, however, relatively little 
is known about the origins of executive function in infancy and the way in which executive function develops 
during the first few years of life. Research on the emergence of executive function in infancy has the potential 
to reveal the cognitive architecture that provides the foundation for executive function and its development in 
later years. This article summarizes research on the early development of executive function – measured at the 
end of the first year of life in the context of search for hidden objects – and then presents a formal theory of the 
processes underlying executive function: the Hierarchical Competing Systems Model (HCSM). The HCSM 
characterizes the starting-state of executive function development, and highlights the inter-relations among 
associative learning, conscious reflection, and language acquisition. Although these domains have been studied 
independently, there have been few attempts to provide an integrated account that focuses on their combined 




Search for hidden objects 
Piaget (1954) observed that infants who display secondary circular reactions (i.e. substage III, 4 to 8 months of 
age) search manually for hidden objects. Their search ability is constrained, however, to situations where the 
object is visible when the reach begins. For example, Piaget reported that infants will search if the object is only 
partially hidden, and Bower and Wishart (1972) found that infants who were unable to locate a toy under a cup 
were indeed able to reach for an attractive object after the lights were turned out (see also Clifton, Muir, 
Ashmead & Clarkson, 1993; Hood & Willats, 1986). Typically, these tasks involve one hiding location, as the 
phenomenon of interest is whether infants will reach for the attractive object. 
 
A classic paradigm for research on executive function in infants and toddlers is the search task with multiple 
locations (see, e.g. Diamond, 1985; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999). In a typical search task, children watch as an 
object is conspicuously hidden at one of several locations, a delay is imposed, and then children must search for 
the object. Although the task is relatively simple (allowing it to be used when infants are old enough to reach; 
i.e. older than about 6 months of age), it contains all the elements of a typical measure of executive function 
with children. To solve the task, children must represent the object’s current location, keep this information in 
mind, and then use it to guide their search. If they err, they must detect their errors and correct them. These 
elements also correspond to the latent variables associated with executive functions in adults reported by 
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter and Wager (2000): inhibiting, shifting, and updating. Children 
must inhibit their learned response to search at Location A, children must shift from the task of searching at A 
to searching at B, and update their working memory of the hiding event from Location A to Location B. 
 
The use of search tasks to study cognition in young children has a long history, and was pioneered by Walter 
Hunter. In a seminal article, Hunter (1917) described his experiments on the ‘delayed reaction’ in his daughter, 
Thayer, when she was between 13 and 16 months old (prior to vocal language). In these tasks, an attractive 
object was conspicuously hidden in one of three boxes. After a delay during which Thayer was distracted, she 
was oriented towards the middle box and then allowed to search for the object. Hunter found that by 16 months 
of age, Thayer was typically successful when the delay was less than 24 seconds, but increasingly error prone as 
the delays increased. Integrating these findings with his earlier work with non-human animals (Hunter, 1913), 
Hunter revealed that Thayer’s performance was superior to ‘Rat No. 9’ on a similar task, but inferior to ‘Bob’ 
the raccoon and ‘Blackie’ the dog. Hunter concluded that vocal language was not necessary for success, and he 
speculated that the acquisition of vocal language would render the task trivial, even over long delays. 
 
The delayed reaction task (also called ‘delayed response’ task) has been used extensively as an assessment of 
frontal lobe function in non-human primates, and lesion studies indicate clearly that successful performance on 
the task depends on the integrity of prefrontal cortex – especially dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (see Fuster, 
1980; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Jacobsen, 1936). For this reason, it has also been used to examine prefrontally 
mediated memory (especially simple working memory) in infancy, childhood, and across the lifespan. For 
example, Diamond and Doar (1989) administered a delayed response task longitudinally from 6 to 12 months of 
age. The infants received 16 trials in which they searched for an object that was hidden in one of two identical 
hiding wells. The results confirmed that infants can tolerate longer delays as they get older (roughly an 
additional 2.1 seconds per month), which is consistent with the idea that performance on the delayed response 
task in infancy reflects the growth of prefrontal cortex and the development of working memory. 
 
More direct evidence of the role of prefrontally mediated working memory in infant search comes from work by 
Baird, Kagan, Gaudette, Walz, Hershlag and Boas (2002), who used near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) to 
compare changes in cerebral blood flow between infants (5 to 12 months) who reliably searched for hidden 
objects and infants who did not. Infants who searched showed an increase in blood flow (total haemoglobin) in 
prefrontal cortex, whereas those who did not search showed a decrease from baseline. 
 
Studies using the delayed response task have generally confirmed that it is a useful measure for both short- and 
long-term memory not only in infancy, but also in early childhood and indeed across the lifespan. Schutte and 
Spencer (2002, Experiments 1 and 2), for example, employed a variant of the delayed response task in a 
continuous search space with 3-year-olds. In this task, children searched for a spaceship by moving a handheld 
rocket to where a spaceship had previously appeared. One advantage of using a continuous search space (i.e. no 
distinct hiding locations) is that it provides a more sensitive measure of the magnitude of errors: the distance 
between the actual location and the children’s responses. In Schutte and Spencer’s work, children were biased 
to search towards the center of the targets, and this bias increased with the length of the delay. The authors 
concluded that the bias arises from both the blending in long-term memory of all target locations and children’s 
natural tendency to search towards the middle of a search space. 
 
Lyons-Warren, Lillie and Hershey (2004) also employed a delayed response task in a continuous search space 
to assess both short- and long-term memory from late childhood across the lifespan (7–80 years). While 
engaged in an object recognition task, participants used a mouse to move a cursor to the location where they had 
previously seen a stimulus appear. On trials with short delays (thought to reflect short-term memory), per-
formance improved with age throughout childhood and adolescence, but deteriorated with age throughout 
adulthood. In contrast, on trials with long delays (thought to reflect long-term memory), performance improved 
steadily with age through adolescence, but changed very little across the remainder of the lifespan. 
 
Although many varieties of delayed response task have been employed in work with infants and children, by far 
the most common is a specific version pioneered by Piaget (1954): the A-not-B paradigm. In a typical A-not-B 
task, children observe an object hidden at one of two or more locations (Location A), and search for the object 
after a delay. After successfully retrieving the object a number of times, children then observe the object 
conspicuously hidden at a second location (Location B). The A-not-B error arises when participants search 
incorrectly (and perseveratively) at Location A instead of Location B. Perseverative search on the B trial (i.e. 
the A-not-B error) may arise due to a failure to represent the object’s current location or to difficulties using a 
correct representation of the object’s location to constrain their search. 
 
The vast majority of research using the A-not-B task has been conducted with infants between 8 and 12 months 
of age, and it is well established that A-not-B errors are common between 8 and 10 months but that older infants 
often search successfully on the B trials. Marcovitch and Zelazo (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of research 
on this task that revealed the following: (a) performance improved with age (e.g. Sophian & Wellman, 1983), 
(b) errors were more likely to occur after longer delays (e.g. Gratch, Appel, Evans, LeCompte & Wright, 1974), 
(c) errors decreased as the distance between the hiding locations increased (e.g. Horobin & Acredolo, 1986), (d) 
increasing the number of hiding locations decreased perseverative behavior, but increased the likelihood of 
searching between the A and B locations (e.g. Diamond, Cruttenden & Neiderman, 1994), and (e) errors 
increased proportionally to the number of A trials. 
 
The conclusion that the number of A trials affected performance was particularly interesting for a number of 
reasons. First, a previous meta-analysis of the A-not-B error (Wellman, Cross & Bartsch, 1986) had failed to 
reveal an effect of A trial experience. Second, only one study (Landers, 1971) had ever revealed a significant 
relation between the number of A trials and the A-not-B error, while several studies did not report a significant 
relation despite trends in the appropriate direction (Butterworth, 1977; Evans, 1973; Sophian & Wellman, 
1983). Third, and finally, despite the uncertainty concerning the effect of A trial experience, and the assumption 
by some authors that no effect existed (e.g. Harris, 1989; Hofstadter & Reznick, 1996), several theoretical 
accounts predicted such an effect (e.g. Diamond et al., 1994; Munakata, 1997; Thelen & Smith, 1994). As will 
be discussed in a later section, the role of the number of A trials has since been tested directly (Marcovitch & 
Zelazo, 2006; Marcovitch, Zelazo & Schmuckler, 2002; Smith, Thelen, Titzer & McLin, 1999). 
 
Piaget (1954) originally attributed the A-not-B error to an incomplete understanding of object permanence. On 
this view, infants egocentrically assume that the reappearance of the hidden object depends on their reaches, and 
so they continue to reach to Location A in an effort to reproduce the object. Although some authors have 
continued to attribute the error at least in part to an incomplete understanding of object permanence (e.g. Harris, 
1989), Piaget’s interpretation has fallen out of favor with most contemporary researchers for at least two 
reasons: 
(1) Studies that used looking time, as opposed to searching accuracy, as a dependent measure have revealed 
that children exhibit a sensitivity to object permanence as early as 3.5 months of age (Baillargeon & DeVos, 
1991). Indeed, Ahmed and Ruffman (1998, Experiment 1) provided a striking example of 8- to 12- month-old 
infants who committed the A-not-B error when they searched manually, but were surprised (indicated by longer 
looking times) when the experimenter retrieved the object from the seemingly impossible Location A. From this 
point of view, the A-not-B error does not reflect a deficit in object permanence understanding, but rather an 
inability to control motor behavior effectively. This is consistent with an executive function explanation of the 
A-not-B task, according to which infants have difficulty using their knowledge to guide their search (e.g. 
because of difficulty inhibiting a previously correct response). 
 
(2) The A-not-B error can be elicited in older children who clearly do not have difficulty with the object 
permanence concept (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2006; Sophian & Wellman, 1983; Spencer, Smith & Thelen, 2001; 
Zelazo, Reznick & Spinazzola, 1998). In these studies, the standard task is usually modified. For example, 
Sophian and Wellman (1983) elicited perseverative search in 2-yearold children by surreptitiously hiding the 
object on B trials while stating verbally the correct location (e.g. ‘The soap will be in the bird’s box’, p. 382).  
Presumably, observing the conspicuous hiding of the object is necessary for 2-year-olds to use the current 
information to override the influence of previous experience on the A trials. In another variant of the A-not-B 
task, Zelazo et al. (1998) elicited perseveration when the crucial choice of where to search was embedded 
within a sequence of steps. To retrieve a hidden candy, children were required to execute a four-step retrieval 
process: (a) remove a foam barrier, (b) pull a tray, (c) choose a stimulus, and (d) pull the stimulus to reveal the 
candy. Perseveration in this version of the task may reflect the fact that children have particular difficulty 
analyzing practiced routines into separate steps and modifying an intermediate step (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 
1992). There is some indication, however, that children beyond 12 months of age may continue to perseverate 
even in the standard version of the A-not-B task, at least under some circumstances. Espy, Kaufmann, 
McDiarmid and Glisky (1999) found that with a 10-second delay between hiding and finding, even preschoolers 
made perseverative errors, although the number of perseverative errors decreased between the ages of 23 and 66 
months. Overall, then, it is now clear that the A-not-B error is not limited to infancy, but rather that it can 
continue to be elicited later in childhood. This finding suggests that perseverative influences on search persist 
beyond the developmental period during which it is plausible to invoke conceptual explanations of the A-not-B 
phenomenon. 
 
Rather than postulate conceptual difficulties, most contemporary explanations of the A-not-B error have 
focused on cognitive mechanisms such as memory, inhibitory control, and some combination of the two. First, 
some authors have suggested that infants have difficulty keeping the object’s new location in mind – essentially 
a problem of simple working memory (e.g. Cummings & Bjork, 1983; Fox, Kagan & Weiskopf, 1979; Harris, 
1973; Munakata, McClelland, Johnson & Siegler, 1997; Schacter, Moscovitch, Tulving, McLachlan & 
Freedman, 1986). According to one version of this account (Cummings & Bjork, 1983), infants encode the 
general vicinity of the hiding location but lack the sophistication to encode the specific location; hence, they are 
likely to confuse the A and B locations. Support for the role of memory difficulties in bringing about the A-not-
B error comes from research demonstrating that the likelihood of perseveration is affected by the duration of the 
delay between hiding and finding (Diamond, 1985; Harris, 1973). 
 
Second, an alternative to these memory accounts has been to hypothesize that infants have difficulty inhibiting a 
prepotent tendency to reach to Location A despite keeping the object’s correct location in mind (e.g. 
Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos & Black, 1990; Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990; Dempster, 1992). This hypothesis 
is consistent with research revealing that infants sometimes perseverate even when the object is visible at 
Location B (and hence no memory in required; Butterworth, 1977; Harris, 1974) or even while looking at the 
correct location (Diamond, 1985; Piaget, 1954). 
 
Finally, Diamond (1985; Diamond et al., 1994) has proposed that correct responding on an A-not-B task 
requires both the memory of the correct location and inhibition of the previously correct response (i.e. memory 
+ inhibition hypothesis; Diamond et al., 1994). Diamond et al. provided compelling evidence for this 
hypothesis using a 7-location A-not-B task. According to the logic of the memory account put forth by Cum-
mings and Bjork (1983), on B trials, infants should search in the vicinity of Location B but not necessarily 
precisely at Location B. Thus, if A-not-B errors on a standard 2-location task resulted only from failures in 
memory, then errors in the 7-location task should cluster around Location B. Similarly, if A-not-B errors 
resulted only from failures in inhibition, then errors in the 7- location task should cluster around Location A. 
However, if failures in both memory and inhibition account for A-not-B errors, then infants should search 
between Locations A and B (i.e. errors should tend to be clustered between these locations). Indeed, infants’ 
search was best characterized by the memory + inhibition account (but see Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999, for a 
computational account that does not require inhibition). Although this approach has been influential and 
instrumental in stimulating research on the topic, the desire for increased theoretical precision regarding the 
mechanisms underlying search has motivated some authors to develop computational models of A-not-B 
performance, and it is to these models that we now turn. 
 
Computational theories of A-not-B search 
In recent years, there have been several attempts to provide formal models of the processes underlying A-not-B 
search. The value of computational modeling for understanding cognitive development is now well established 
(e.g. Elman, 1990; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2000; Morton & Munakata, 2002; Shultz, 2003; Simon & Halford, 
1995; Thelen, Schöner, Scheier & Smith, 2001). Among other things, computational modeling requires 
identifying and formalizing the mechanisms of developmental change, and simulations based on computational 
models often generate novel hypotheses – including hypotheses that are unlikely to have been obvious in the 
absence of a formal model. As such, computational models may be used to guide a program of experimental 
behavioral research. 
 
One of the first computational models of the A-not-B search was the neural network model of prefrontal cortex 
put forth by Dehaene and Changeux (1989). This model was designed to account for performance on delayed 
response tasks, including the A-not-B task. Input units encode features of an object and its hiding location while 
output units orient the organism towards one of the hiding locations. It is interesting to note that orientation 
towards a particular location can be based on a feature of the object (e.g. orient towards the blue one) or a 
feature of the hiding location (e.g. orient towards the one on the left). Behavior is positively reinforced (i.e. 
strengthening the connectivity between units) when orientation is towards the correct object and punished (i.e. 
weakening the connectivity between units) when orientation is towards the wrong object. 
 
In Level 1 of the model, input units are connected directly to output units (see Figure 1). Simulations with Level 
1 produce correct orientation on A trials. On B trials, however, the model initially orients towards Location A 
(i.e. commits the A-not-B error), followed by a period of random responding, and then eventually begins to 
orient consistently towards Location B. After a period of correct B trials, the Level 1 model perseverates again 
when the object is switched back to Location A. In other words, the Level 1 model can never succeed at both 
locations at the same time. Thus, the Level 1 model adequately simulates the behavior of 7.5- to 9-month-old 
infants who search successfully at the first location and then perseverate to the recently correct location when-
ever the object is moved (e.g. Diamond & Doar, 1989; Hofstadter & Reznick, 1996). 
 
Level 2 of the model includes two additional layers of units organized hierarchically (see Figure 1). The first 
layer of memory units stores information about the object features, but only if the appropriate rule coding units 
in the second layer are active. Appropriate rules are reinforced across trials. For example, in an A-not-B task, 
the location of the object is more important than the color of the object. Across trials, the ‘location rule’ will be 
activated and input from the location input units becomes associated with the memory units. This additional 
input allows active memory units to maintain their activation across a delay, and hence to influence the 
orientation of the network. Simulations using both Levels 1 and 2 together demonstrate performance equivalent 
to 12-month-old infants on the A-not-B task (i.e. correct performance regardless of whether the location was 
switched from the previous trial). Based on these simulations, Dehaene and Changeux (1989) emphasize the 




Munakata (1998) proposed a different model of the role of prefrontal cortex in search. She suggested that the 
development of prefrontal cortex affects active, but not latent, memory traces. Latent memory traces evolve 
from processing a stimulus so that the organism may react differently to the stimulus in the future. In contrast, 
active memory traces involve the active maintenance of a representation that remains accessible over a delay 
during which the stimulus is absent. Munakata (1998) implemented a parallel distributed processing (PDP) 
model to demonstrate how the A-not-B error can be attributed to weak active traces for Location B failing to 
override latent traces for Location A. 
 
According to Munakata (1998), latent traces in PDP networks are instantiated as changes to the connection 
weights between units whereas active traces arise from the sustained activation of units. Her model consists of 
input units that independently code for the hiding location, the type of cover, and the type of object; hidden 
units that embody a representation of the hiding locations; and output units that reveal the location at which the 
network will gaze and the location at which the network will reach (see Figure 2). Connections to the reaching 
units are updated only once every trial during the A-not-B task (at the point where reaching would occur), but 
connections to the gaze units are updated throughout the trial. Finally, the hidden and output units have 
recurrent connections back to each unit, and these allow for sustained activation. Munakata manipulated the 
weights of the recurrent connections to simulate networks with different representational capabilities (related to 
the ‘age’ of the network and the growth of active memory). 
 
Besides simulating the A-not-B error in a canonical task, Munakata’s (1998) model impressively accounts for a 
wide range of empirical findings, such as eliciting the error when A experience is observational (e.g. when 
infants simply watch an object being hidden during the A trials but do not have an opportunity to retrieve the 
object at Location A; Smith et al., 1999). The model also accounts for improved performance: (1) in looking 
procedures, (2) with age, (3) across shorter delays, (4) with multiple locations (more than 2), (5) with distinctive 
covers, and (6) when the object is hidden only on the B trials. However, one limitation of Munakata’s model is 
in explaining perseverative behavior throughout the lifespan within the context of a single model. As 
simulations of older children (and a fortiori adults) must begin with stronger recurrent weights than the 
simulations of successful infants, it is difficult to conceive of how this framework could account for A-not-B 
type errors later in life. In later work, Morton and Munakata (2002) presented a different neural network model 
of perseveration of preschool children, but the nature of the preschoolers’ task was different enough that it is 
difficult to compare and integrate the two models (although they are both based on the same fundamental 
principles of active versus latent traces of memory). 
 
Another contemporary computational theory that addresses the A-not-B error is Dynamic Systems Theory 
(DST; Smith et al., 1999; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Thelen et al., 2001), which postulates that search behavior can 
be predicted by the internal dynamic relations between a host of psychological systems, including the 
perception of the experimental context, the encoding of the hiding event, and the memory resulting from 
previous searches. According to DST, search behavior is influenced by the coupling of looking and reaching. 
On the first A trial, infants’ attention is recruited by the hiding event, and this increases the probability that the 
infant will be looking at, and therefore reaching to, Location A. However, this bias is ephemeral, and may not 
be strong enough to initiate reaching behavior, which explains why many infants do not search on the first A 
trial (see Smith et al., 1999, for details). On subsequent A trials, the probability of searching at Location A 
increases as the magnitude of the bias increases. Furthermore, once reaching to Location A has occurred, the 
memory of these reaches at Location A reinforces the looking/reaching systems’ proclivity towards Location A. 
The A-not-B error results from the combined influence of two factors: (a) a strong bias to search towards 
Location A that was established on the A trials, and (b) the likelihood that infants’ attention towards Location B 
at the time of hiding will shift away during the delay period. If the locations are visually similar to one another, 
infants may shift their attention to the wrong location, which in turn will elicit inappropriate searching 
behavior. Eight- to 12-month-old infants are poorly skilled at reaching (which is coupled to looking), so they 
are easily attracted to locations that look the same as the target location. In other words, for these infants, the 
visually similar target is insufficient to override the experience at Location A. Indeed, when Location B is 
visually distinct from Location A, the probability of making the A-not-B error is reduced, although it is not 
eliminated (A. Bremner & Bryant, 2001; Smith et al., 1999). 
 
Thelen et al. (2001) provide a comprehensive description of the computational details behind the DST. In this 
account, reaching behavior reflects the state of activation of a motor planning field. On any given trial, the 
activation of this field is a function of the dynamic looking pattern on that trial and the specific events of 
looking and reaching that occurred on previous trials. More specifically, the model includes a function S(x, t) 
for the motor planning field that relies on three sources of input: (a) task input, (b) specific input, and (c) 
memory input. The task input is constant and captures the activation caused by the persistent perceptual 
elements of the task (e.g. the potential hiding locations). In contrast, the specific input is short lived, varies from 
trial to trial, and captures the activation caused by the cueing event (e.g. hiding an object, waving a lid). The 
final input, memory input, has a recursive relation to the motor planning field. Specifically, memory is derived 
directly from the cumulative activation of all previous trials (and, in a broader sense, the entire history of the 
organism, although this is not an explicit input in the Thelen et al. model). With appropriate parameterization, 
the model was very effective in simulating the canonical A-not-B error, including the effects of age, delay, and 
the role of distinctive covers. Recently, the theory has been extended to account for a variety of other 
phenomena, including the increased tendency to search away from Location A and towards Location B (i.e. 
spatial drift) across delays (Schutte & Spencer, 2002) and the increased precision of spatial working memory 
across development (Spencer & Schutte, 2004; see also Schutte, Spencer & Schöner, 2003; Spencer et al., 
2001). 
 
To summarize, there are now several computational models of A-not-B search, and these models have been 
able to account for an impressive number of empirical findings. Besides generating novel empirical predictions 
that can be tested in children, the computational nature of these models has allowed precise quantification of the 
psychological processes involved, and it has increased our understanding of how these processes may change 
over time. This kind of formalization is exactly what is necessary for a unified developmental theory. From our 
perspective, one limitation of most of these models is that it remains unclear how they may account for further 
improvements in executive function beyond infancy – including those occurring during childhood and into 
adolescence (e.g. Diamond, 2002; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). One notable exception is DST, which relies on the 
relative strengths of competing responses to determine behavior. In that spirit, but in an effort to address the 
development of consciousness, the hierarchical competing systems model (HCSM), described below, is 
intended to serve as a foundation for a more comprehensive model of the development of executive function. 
 
 
Overview of the hierarchical competing systems model 
The hierarchical competing systems model (HCSM) is a refinement and updated formalization of ideas 
introduced in a series of articles by Marcovitch and Zelazo (1999, 2006; Marcovitch et al., 2002). The HCSM 
postulates that goal-directed behavior is influenced by two hierarchically arranged systems, a habit system that 
is dependent on previous experience, and a representational system that captures the influence of conscious 
reflection on behavior and that develops over the course of childhood (Zelazo, 2004). The two systems compete 
to guide behavior such that the representational system can influence, and potentially override, the habit system. 
As can be seen in Figure 3a, activity is elicited simultaneously in both systems, and in the absence of conscious 
reflection, behavior is determined jointly by the two systems but primarily by the response-based system. In 
Figure 3b, conscious reflection is captured by the ability to reflect on the contents of the representational 
system, as indicated by the reciprocal arrow. The influence of the representational system on behavior is 
magnified, and may even override the influence of previous behavior (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2006). 
 
The emergence and early development of top-down, cognitive control is modeled in the context of the A-not-B 
task with infants and young children. In essence, the HCSM postulates that the A-not-B error can only result if: 
(a) there is a strong enough habit to reach at Location A, and (b) there is no conscious reflection at the moment 
of search that will guide behavior to the correct location. Although it is focused on executive function in infants 
and young children, the HCSM is intended to serve as a foundation for an account of executive function across 
the lifespan, emphasizing the role of reflection in processes such as shifting, updating, and inhibition (Miyake et 
al., 2000). Note that the HCSM is similar, but distinct from other views that behavior arises from the product of 
multiple psychological systems. For example, Norman and Shallice (1986) postulated a Supervisory Attentional 
System (SAS) that exerts control over the activation and inhibition values of various schemas. This HCSM 
differs from this model in its emphasis on the role of reflection in bringing about the selection of the relevant 
schema. 
 
For the purpose of the HCSM, reflection on a mental state is tantamount to that mental state being the contents 
of consciousness (cf. Perner & Dienes, 2003; Rosenthal, 1997). This is a recursive process, in that the reflected 
state can then also become the contents of consciousness at a higher level of consciousness (Zelazo, 2004; 
Zelazo & Zelazo, 1998). It is assumed that reflection in this sense is necessary for the deliberate selection 
among possible response options. Thus, although behavior is heavily influenced by the amount and quality of 
previous experience, a deliberate and conscious decision to perform an action can override the influence of 
habit and allow one to exert top-down control over one’s behavior (see also Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & 
Cohen, 2001, and Zelazo et al., 2008, for models of executive function that suggest that conflict monitoring 
triggers top-down control processes). 
 
According to the HCSM, the amount of experience a participant has reaching at the A location (i.e. the number 
of A trials) will influence both the habit strength and the cumulative probability of reflection. Thus, on the one 
hand, more experience at Location A will produce a stronger habit to search at the Location A (cf. Hull, 
Felsinger, Gladstone & Yamaguchi, 1947). On the other hand, more experience with the task in general 
(including searches at Location A) will provide more opportunities for the participant to reflect upon their 
representation of the hidden objects – something that likely interacts with a growing appreciation of the task 
constraints and affordances, including the possible relevance of Location B. If this reflection occurs prior to the 
object being hidden at Location B, then the participant will search correctly on the B trial, no matter how strong 
the habit to search at A.
1 
 
Spatial cues play an important role in search behavior, and infants are more likely to search correctly when the 
locations are visually distinct from one another (e.g. Noland, 2007; Smith et al., 1999). According to the 
HCSM, these cues would serve to increase the influence of the representational system, in part by providing 
additional cues to be labeled. This is generally consistent with A. Bremner and Bryant’s (2001; see also J.G. 
Bremner, 1978; Butterworth, Jarrett & Hicks, 1982) view that strong spatial cues encourage updates of the 
object’s locations. Note that as long as participants reach to Location A on A trials, the HCSM does not predict 
that the spatial cues (i.e. distinctive covers) would affect the habit system. This prediction is consistent with 
DST (Thelen et al., 2001),
2
 but counter to Munakata’s (1998) assertion that distinctive covers reduce 
associations to Location A. 
 
In many respects, the HCSM is compatible with other computational models of A-not-B search, particularly in 
emphasizing the importance of previous experience at Location A. However, the HCSM differs from these 
models in two ways: 
 
1. The HCSM postulates that because of conscious reflection, increases in the number of A trials will 
eventually improve search performance on the B trials. Other models, in contrast, propose that increases in the 
number of A trials will never decrease the probability of perseveration – indeed, they should increase it. 
 
2. Whereas other models suggest that improved performance results from simple rule learning (Dehaene & 
Changeux, 1989), or increases in active memory (Munakata, 1998), the HCSM postulates a conscious 
representational system that has the potential to develop through a series of degrees of reflection, or levels of 
consciousness (Zelazo, 2004). According to the model, consciousness can operate at multiple discrete levels, 
and these levels have a hierarchical structure – they vary from a first-order level of consciousness to higher-
order reflective levels. Higher levels of consciousness are brought about through an iterative process of 
reflection, or the recursive reprocessing of the contents of consciousness. Each degree of reprocessing results in 
a higher level of consciousness, and this in turn allows for a stimulus to be considered relative to a larger 
interpretive context, with consequence for behavioral control. 
 
Figure 4 contrasts two cases in which action is based on different levels of consciousness. In Panel 1, action 
occurs in the absence of any reflection at all – it occurs on the basis of what is referred to as minimal 
consciousness (minC). An object in the environment (objA) triggers a salient, low-resolution ‘description’ from 
semantic long-term memory. In the context of the A-not-B task, objA is not the hidden object per se, but rather 
the location of the object in space (i.e. one of the hiding locations). This description (or IobjA, for ‘intentional 
object’) then becomes an intentional object of minC, by way of which it automatically triggers the most strongly 
associated action program in procedural long-term memory or elicits a stored stimulus–reward association. A 
particular hiding location, for example, may have been associated with interesting activity (e.g. a hiding event) 
or a reward (e.g. retrieving an object), and so, when seen, may elicit reaching toward that location. 
 
In Panel 2, action is based on one degree of reflection, resulting in a higher level of consciousness called recur-
sive consciousness (recC). Now when objA triggers IobjA and becomes the content of minC, instead of 
triggering an associated action program directly, IobjA is fed back into minC (at a subsequent moment) where it 
can be related to a label (descA) from semantic long-term memory. This descA can then be decoupled from the 
minC experience that was labeled, and it can be deposited into long-term memory (where it provides a 
potentially enduring trace of the experience) and into working memory where it can serve as a goal (G1) that 
triggers an action program even in the absence of objA, and even if IobjA would otherwise trigger a different 
action program. For example, in the A-not-B task, the toddler may respond on the basis of a representation (in 
working memory) of the object at its current B location and avoid responding on the basis of an acquired 
tendency to reach to Location A. The toddler responds mediately to the decoupled label in working memory 
rather than immediately to a superficial gloss of the situation. In what follows, we state explicitly the roles of 
habit and reflection in search behavior, and attempt to show how these systems change with age and with 
various environmental influences. 
 
Specific computational formalization of the HCSM 
Habit system 
The influence of the habit system on search is directly proportional to the strength of the habit. As suggested by 
Marcovitch and Zelazo (1999) and others (e.g. Anderson, 1993; Hull, 1943), habit strength should be positively 
related to the amount of direct experience. It also seems reasonable that this function should be negatively 
accelerating and reach a maximal habit strength (i.e. the function should be asymptotic); an increase in habit 
strength may be expected between 1 and 6 A trials, but not necessarily between 101 and 106 A trials, for 
example. Thus, the model postulates that the probability of searching incorrectly on the first B trial due to habit 
is described by the following asymptotic function: 
 
Prob(searchA) = α + logβ(numA); max = 1.0 (1) 
 
where Prob(searchA) is the probability of searching at A based on habit (max is 1.0), numA is the number of A 
trials, α is the parameter that accounts for the baseline probability of searching at Location A after 1 trial, and 0 
is the parameter that captures the rate of increase in habit strength. Specifically, lower values for 0 will cause 
habit strength to reach an asymptote more quickly. 
 
As will be discussed in the simulation section, plausible values for the parameters for 9-month-olds are a = .49 
and 0 = 33. Figure 5a displays the probability of incorrectly searching at A as a function of the number of A 
trials using these parameter values. Note that the probability of searching incorrectly due to habit increases with 
number of A trials, but reaches its maximal influence after about 6 A trials (i.e. the influence of habit does not 
change between 6 and 11 A trials). 
 
Conscious representational system 
One assumption of the HCSM is that a representation of the hidden object is formed after observing the hiding 
event (see Dehaene & Changeux, 1989; Diamond et al., 1994; Mareschal, Plunkett & Harris, 1995; Munakata, 
1998; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984; Thelen & Smith, 1994, for similar ideas). This representation will 
influence behavior, even in the absence of reflection on the representation. A number of research studies 
provide compelling evidence that search errors do not always occur exactly at Location A; rather, search errors 
occur between the A and B locations, as if the representation of the hidden object partially ‘pulls’ the reach 
towards the correct location (Diamond et al., 1994; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2006; Schutte & Spencer, 2002; 
Spencer et al., 2001). The HCSM goes one step further – if appropriate reflection on the representation occurs 
prior to reaching (e.g. consciously noticing the current location of the object) then the representational system 
will influence behavior absolutely, leading to correct performance. 
 
On any given trial, there is a baseline probability that the participant may reflect on the representation of the 
hidden object. This probability depends on the developmental level of the child (e.g. it will be higher for older 
children compared to younger children, and higher for typically developing children compared to delayed 
children) and task difficulty (i.e. it will be higher for simple tasks than for complex tasks). 
 
The model postulates that even if the probability of reflecting on a given trial is small (as you might expect from 
an infant or a toddler), this probability cumulates across trials and increases with task experience. Thus, the 
model works under the assumption that once reflection occurs on any trial during the task, it will re-occur on 
subsequent trials: children will have adopted a higher level of consciousness in this context. The probability that 
the participant will reflect at some time during the task is described by: 
 




where Prob(CR) is the cumulative probability that reflection will have occurred, numA is the number of A 
trials, and γ is a parameter that represents the probability of reflection on any given trial. For γ= .046 (i.e. a low 
4.6% chance of reflection on any given trial), the cumulative probability of correctly reflecting on the 
representation as a function of the number of A trials can be seen in Figure 5b. The cumulative probability of 
reflection, which guarantees correct search, increases with exposure to the task. 
 
Combination of both systems 
Combining Equations 1 and 2, incorrect search at A on the first B trial will occur: (a) if the participant has not 
reflected on the representation of the object, and (b) the habit system influences search at Location A. This is 
expressed by: 
 
CombinedProb(searchA) = [1  − Prob(CR)] 
                                             × [Prob(searchA)]  (3) 
 
The probability of incorrect search as a function of the number of A trials is displayed in Figure 5c. Thus, with 
the above-mentioned parameter values, the HCSM predicts a non-monotonic, U-shaped relation between the 
number of A trials and the probability of incorrectly searching at A on the B trial. This feature of the model is 
unique; no other extant model of memory postulates a non-monotonic relation. 
 
The psychological role of the parameters 
Both α and β are parameters that influence habit strength. For the purpose of the present model, habit is defined 
as an implicit influence on behavior mediated by motor movements. Following the logic of DST (e.g. 
Clearfield, Diedrich, Smith & Thelen, 2006; Gershkoff-Stowe & Thelen, 2004; Thelen et al., 2001), as infants 
and young children develop, movements become more efficient (e.g. less jerky), which produces stronger motor 
memory traces. All things being equal, α (the probability of searching at A after a single A trial) should increase 
with age, while β should decrease with age (which results in a more efficient and faster increase of habit 
strength). In addition, the values of a and 0 should be affected by the complexity of the reaching movement. 
Simple reaches (e.g. direct unimpeded reaches towards the target) are more stable than complex reaches (e.g. 
reaching around an obstacle) and, according to the logic of Clearfield et al. (2006), will lead to stronger motor 
memory traces at any age. 
 
The parameter y is the probability of reflection on a particular trial, and it is postulated to increase with age as a 
function of the development of consciousness and to vary as a function of other influences on representational 
strength, such as divided attention (e.g. Zelazo, 2004). Indeed, at any given age, representational strength can be 
increased by directing attention to the appropriate stimulus via labeling. Labeling prompts reflection on the 
object labeled (Jacques & Zelazo, 2005) and it may facilitate the influence of the conscious representational 
system in at least two ways. First, when the contents of subjective experience are labeled, the label can then be 
decoupled from the immediate situation and be maintained in working memory (as shown in Figure 4, Panel 2). 
This provides the child with a potentially enduring trace of his or her experience, and allows him or her to act in 
the absence of, or even in spite of, direct environmental stimulation (e.g. noticing the old Location A). Second, 
labeling transforms what was subjective into an object of conscious consideration; it makes one’s 
representations an object of reflection. Without language (or a comparable symbol system), children would be 
limited to unreflective consciousness of immediate interoor exteroceptor stimulation (i.e. responding 
immediately to perceptual stimuli). 
From this perspective, age-related changes in reflection can be explained by changes in self-initiated labeling 
strategies. For example, 12-month-old infants respond to labeled objects which may indicate early emergence of 
reflection – the ability to match a perceptual experience that resides in minimal consciousness with a label (i.e. 
recursive consciousness; Zelazo, 2004). According to the HCSM, infants at this age (and not 9-month-olds) 
typically pass the standard A-not-B task because of recursive consciousness of the appropriate representation. 
Note that recursive consciousness per se does not have to be explicit. It is only when recursive consciousness 
itself becomes the contents of consciousness that the process is explicit, which is when children are aware of the 
labels and can use them effectively. Increases in task experience (and with specific stimuli) will afford more 
opportunity to engage in recursive consciousness. By 2 years of age, many children will readily label familiar 
objects (i.e. evidence of another level of reflection), although sometimes only when prompted. Thus according 
to the HCSM, children demonstrate powerful reflective tendencies when labeling occurs (either spontaneously 
or after a prompt), and would be able to override relatively simple prepotent responses (e.g. searching at a 
previous location). Further age-related increases in reflection come about with more advanced labeling 
strategies (e.g. generating mnemonics) and these can be used to override more powerful prepotent tendencies 
(e.g. solving multiplication problems incorrectly). 
 
Hypotheses generated from the model 
The HCSM makes a number of predictions, six of which are presented here. Where possible, we summarize 
behavioral findings relevant to these predictions. 
 
H1: Under certain conditions, the relation between the number of A trials and performance on 
the B trials is non-monotonic. That is to say, children will be more likely to search 
perseveratively (i.e. incorrectly searching at A on B trials) after a moderate number of A trials 
than after relatively few or relatively many trials. 
 
H1 has been confirmed in a standard A-not-B task conducted with 9-month-old infants (Marcovitch et al., 
2002). In this study, infants searched for an object either 1, 6, or 11 times at Location A. Then, when the object 
was conspicuously hidden at Location B, infants were more likely to search incorrectly after 6 A trials (79%) 
than after 1 A trial (43%) or 11 A trials (57%). Figure 6 displays the remarkably close fit between the actual 
data and the proposed computational model, when the parameters are set to a = .49, 0 = 33, and y = .046 (i.e. the 
same parameter values as listed above). The decrease in performance between 1 and 6 A trials is caused 
primarily by increases in habit strength, whereas the improved performance after 11 A trials indicates the 




An alternative mechanism that may account for the U-shaped pattern of results is habituation. From this 
perspective, infants habituate after 11 A trials and begin to respond randomly, which appears to be an improve-
ment compared to the systematic perseveration after 6 A trials. Although this cannot be ruled out completely, 
Marcovitch et al. (2002) argued that if infants habituate after many trials, then they should respond randomly on 
the final A trials prior to the B trial. Furthermore, across all B trials there should be random, not systematic, 
performance. Results indicated that infants rarely erred on the final A trials, and B trial performance was 
systematic (i.e. once a correct response was produced, all subsequent responses were correct). 
 
Habituation may also play a role in the sense that after 11 trials, infants are habituated to events at Location A 
and thus show increased attention to novel events, such as hiding at Location B. This view would be consistent 
with DST, as infants are likely to search where they are attending. As argued elsewhere (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 
2006), we contend that this view is not incompatible with the HCSM; rather, the automaticity of responses after 
many A trials may be what frees up cognitive resources to allow for the opportunity to reflect. 
The U-shaped effect was also elicited with 2-year-old children in an age-appropriate modification of the A-not-
B task (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2006, Experiment 1). In this study, 2-year-olds were tested on the multistep, 
multilocation search task. To find the reward, children engaged in a multistep retrieval procedure: (a) they 
removed a foam barrier, (b) they pulled out a tray which revealed 5 symbols, (c) they pulled on the symbol that 
was attached by a string to a plastic bag that contained the reward. Children were more likely to make a 
perseverative error (i.e. incorrectly search at Location A on the first B trial) after searching correctly on 6 A 
trials (63%), as opposed to 1 A trial (29%) or 11 A trials (39%). 
 
 
Further evidence for a U-shaped effect with 2-yearolds was demonstrated in an A-not-B variant where the 
search space was homogeneous (i.e. continuous) rather than heterogeneous (i.e. discrete). In this study (Marco-
vitch & Zelazo, 2006, Experiment 2), which used a task developed by Spencer et al. (2001), objects were 
hidden in a sandbox and the amount of time needed to find the object was taken as an index of perseverative 
behavior (i.e. if children were incorrectly searching at Location A, it would take them more time to find the 
object at the correct Location B). Once again, a U-shaped relation was apparent: children took the longest time 
to find the object after 11 A trials (mean = 20.8 s), as opposed to after 3 A trials (mean = 8.6 s), 7 A trials (mean 
= 10.7 s), or 15 A trials (mean = 9.2 s). Thus, the U-shaped effect postulated by the HCSM has now been 
replicated across three different tasks and two different age groups. Because it is not obvious how other models 
could be modified to account for them, these findings provide important support for the HCSM relative to other 
accounts of perseveration. 
 
H2: On a given task and all things being equal, as infants and children get older the relation 
between perseverative behavior and the number of A trials will shift from being U-shaped to 
being monotonically decreasing to eventually disappear due to a ceiling effect. 
 
H2 was derived from simulations where α and β were kept constant, and γ (postulated to increase with age) was 
manipulated. As shown in Figure 7, as γ increases, the relation shifts from U-shaped (γ = .04), to monotonically 
decreasing (γ = .3), to near perfect performance (γ = .9). This prediction is consistent with Marcovitch and 
Zelazo’s (2001) suggestion that even after hundreds of A trials in a simple A-not-B task, an attentive adult will 
search correctly on the B trial, easily overriding the habit system (although a distracted adult may indeed 
perseverate; see H4 below). Thus, age-related improvements in representation will not only result in better 
performance but will also change the nature of the relation between the number of A trials and perseverative 
behavior. 
 
This prediction remains to be tested empirically, but it is consistent with the results of research assessing adults’ 
performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948; Grant & Cost, 1954). In the 
WCST, participants are given test cards that vary on three dimensions (shape, color, and number), and must 
discover the rule for matching them to target cards that also vary on these dimensions. After sorting correctly by 
this rule on a certain number of consecutive trials (i.e. the number of reinforcing trials), the rule changes, and 
participants must infer the new rule. This task is obviously more complex than the A-not-B task, but it does 
require keeping a new rule in mind and using it to guide responding despite interference from a tendency to 
persist in initial fashion. Indeed, patients with lesions to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex often perseverate on this 
task (e.g. Milner, 1964), and the analogy to infants’ performance on the A-not-B task has frequently been noted. 
Consistent with H2, Grant and colleagues varied the number of reinforcing trials, and found that adults were 
significantly less likely to perseverate, and more likely to switch, as a direct function of the number of 
reinforcing trials (see Figure 8). Rather than a clear U-shaped effect, as might be expected with younger 
participants, the effect of number of reinforcing trials was monotonically decreasing. 
 
This monotonically decreasing function is also consistent with a model of conscious and unconscious cognition 
put forth by Cleeremans (2006). He contends that experience strengthens the quality of a representation such 
that implicit cognition corresponds to low quality representations, explicit cognition corresponds to moderate 
quality representations, and automaticity corresponds to high quality representations. From this perspective, 
experience with a representation will make it more explicit which in turn renders it more likely to govern 
behavior. 
 
H3: At any given age, the likelihood of successful search can be increased by providing cues, 
such as labels, that call attention to an object or otherwise cause a participant to reflect on it. All 
things being equal, cues should also change the effect of number of A trials on the probability of 
perseveration: with additional cues, the effect should shift from being U-shaped to being 





H3 arises from the proposal that y can be increased via cues, such as labels, that encourage reflection (Homer & 
Nelson, 2005; Jacques & Zelazo, 2005; Zelazo, 2004). Support for this claim was provided by Homer and 
Nelson (2005) who assessed the role of labeling on a variant of DeLoache’s (e.g. 1991) scale model search task. 
In the standard version of this task, children observe a toy being hidden in a three-dimensional scale model of a 
room and are then required to use this information to find an analogous toy that had been hidden in the 
corresponding place in the room itself. Typically, 2.5- year-old children search perseveratively on this task 
(O’Sullivan, Mitchell & Daehler, 2001). However, Homer and Nelson reported that young children’s 
performance improved when they labeled the hiding location, suggesting that labeling is an effective 
metacognitive cue that encourages reflection – at least in children at this age. 
 
The specific role of labeling in effecting reflection can be seen in work by Jacques, Zelazo, Lourenco and 
Sutherland (2006), who found that labeling improved cognitive flexibility on the Flexible Item Selection Task. 
On each trial of this task, children are shown sets of three items designed so one pair matches on one dimension, 
and a different pair matches on a different dimension (e.g. a small yellow teapot, a large yellow teapot, and a 
large yellow shoe). Children are first asked to select one pair (i.e. Selection 1), and then asked to select a 
different pair (i.e. Selection 2). To respond correctly, children must represent the pivot item (i.e. the large 
yellow teapot) according to both dimensions. Four-year-olds generally perform well on Selection 1 but poorly 
on Selection 2, indicating inflexibility. However, asking children to label their perspective on Selection 1 (e.g. 
‘Why do those two pictures go together?’) increased the likelihood that they would adopt a different perspective 
on Selection 2. This is consistent with the suggestion that labeling one’s perspective on a situation encourages 
reflection on that perspective – it helps make it an object of explicit consideration, thereby allowing one to 




H4: At any given age, the likelihood of successful search will be affected by manipulations that 
decrease the likelihood of reflection. All things being equal, these manipulations should also 
change the effect of number of A trials on the probability of perseveration: the relation between 
number of A trials and the probability of perseveration should become more like that 
characteristic of younger participants (see H2). 
 
Manipulations that impair processing of the task context and decrease attention to a hidden object will decrease 
y. One example is divided attention, which can be achieved experimentally by employing a dual-task paradigm 
(e.g. Pashler, 1992). Under dual-task constraints, participants will perform more poorly, but more important, 
they will show patterns of responding that are characteristic of younger children (H2). Specifically, dual-task 
constraints should change the effect of number of A trials on the probability of perseveration. For example, in 
adults, the effect should shift from no effect to monotonically decreasing or to U-shaped. This specific 




H5: Infants and children with better motor coordination (and hence better motor memory – 
resulting in greater habit strength) will display greater levels of perseveration, and require fewer 
trials at A to achieve these levels, than their peers with poorer motor coordination. 
 
H5 is based on simulations where y and 0 were kept constant, and α (postulated to increase with improved 
motor coordination) is manipulated (see Figure 9). Note that identical predictions are generated if a is kept 
constant and 0 is free to vary. When α = .5, the U-shaped pattern observed with 9-month-olds is apparent, with 
maximal perseveration after 5 or 6 A trials. As a increases (i.e. α = .6), the point of maximum perseveration 
decreases (after 4 A trials), which is consistent with the notion that in a highly coordinated individual, fewer 
trials are needed to maximize habit strength. 
 
H6: Children with motor delays will not exhibit the U-shaped relation. After relatively few A 
trials, they will make fewer errors than their typically developing peers. In addition, the relation 
between number of A trials and perseveration will be asymptotic. 
 
Simulations where a is decreased significantly (i.e. a = .3, see Figure 10) reveal lower levels of perseveration 
and the absence of a U-shaped relation. Rivière and Lecuyer (2003) have provided evidence for improved 
performance on search tasks for children with motor delays. In their study, 29-month-old children with spinal 
muscular atrophy searched more correctly than healthy controls of the same age on a modified invisible 
displacement task. This is consistent with the idea that perseverative behavior is manifested by motor memory 
towards Location A, and this can only be achieved through consistent, stable reaches (Clearfield et al., 2006). 
Children who cannot coordinate a stable reach, whether because of age or physical disability, will not form as 
strong a habit toward Location A and will therefore be more likely to succeed on the A-not-B task. 
 
This set of hypotheses is unique, and no extant theory of perseverative search or executive function makes this 
same set of predictions. Although other models posit competing processes akin to the habit system and 
representational system (e.g. Dehaene & Changeux, 1989; Diamond et al., 1994; Mareschal, Plunkett & Harris, 
1999; Munakata, 1998; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984; Thelen et al., 2001), the HCSM is the only contemporary 
theory of perseverative search to emphasize the role of reflection. Besides generating novel hypotheses, the 
HCSM’s focus on reflection allows it to serve as the foundation for a model of the development of executive 
function across the lifespan (see, e.g. Zelazo, Craik & Booth, 2004; Zelazo et al., 2003). 
 
Model extensions and future directions 
In one sense, the proposed quantification of the HCSM has been successful, as it has generated testable 
hypotheses that may serve to increase our understanding of search behavior and the development of executive 
function from infancy throughout the preschool years and beyond. However, the model is still incomplete. The 
following are five extensions of the model that might usefully be implemented: 
 
(1) Further investigation is needed to explore how the parameters help us understand the psychological 
organization of the cognitive systems involved in search. For example, is one parameter (i.e. y) sufficient to 
account for the variety of ways that representational abilities can change? Do a and 0 map on to distinct 
psychological processes (and if not should one of the parameters be eliminated)? 
 
(2) The model currently does not address nonperseverative incorrect responding (i.e. errors that occur at a 
location other than Location A). A complete computational model must account for the established tendency to 
search between the perseverative and correct location (e.g. Diamond et al., 1994; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999, 
2006; Schutte & Spencer, 2002; Spencer et al., 2001), as well as the observed relation between the number of A 
trials and searching exactly at Location A (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2006). 
 
One way that the current model can be applied to paradigms that yield search between the A and B locations is 
to adopt a more liberal definition of perseveration. Specifically, drawing upon previous work by Diamond et al. 
(2004), Spencer et al. (2001), and Marcovitch and Zelazo (2006), perseverative search can encompass all 
behavior that is biased, even partially, by experience at Location A. Thus, the HCSM’s prediction of 
perseverative responding can include all reaches at Location A, or between the A and B locations. A future 
challenge, of course, is to use the HCSM to quantify the degree of perseveration (i.e. how much the reach is 
biased in the A direction). We have proposed previously that search between locations can be modeled by 
summing the effects of a Gaussian distribution with an exponential distribution (see Marcovitch & Zelazo, 
1999, for details), and perhaps this can be integrated into the model in the future. 
(3) The proposed model accounts for the role of habits created by motor movements. However, habits can be 
purely representational (e.g. observing the object being hidden multiple times at a particular location without 
being allowed to reach may create an expectation to see the object at that location). One possibility is that 
representational habits exhibit the same influence as motor habits (cf. Kirkham et al., 2003; Munakata, 1998; 
Zelazo et al., 1998). Indeed, a number of researchers have postulated mechanisms that map observed action 
onto motor representations of that action (e.g. Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben 
& Prinz, 2001), and this mapping may be mediated by mirror neurons (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogassi, 
1996). Alternatively, representational habits may be dependent on the representational system rather than the 
habit system. 
 
(4) The computational model computes the probability of searching perseveratively as its output. The model 
should be extended to account for other dependent measures, which may be more sensitive to the degree of 
perseveration (e.g. response time and the error run, or the number of B trials on which children err prior to 
searching correctly). 
 
(5) The computational model deals with discrete responses (i.e. heterogeneous search spaces). The model 
needs to be extended to deal with homogeneous search spaces (e.g. sandbox task; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2006; 
Spencer et al., 2001). 
 
Conclusion 
Among extant theories of search behavior in infancy and toddlerhood, the HCSM is unique in addressing 
directly the role of conscious control, and it makes several unique predictions as a result. In this article, we 
proposed a quantification of the HCSM that relies on the parameterization of two simple mathematical 
formulae. This quantification helps clarify what is assumed by the model, as well as what is postulated to 
develop. Computational simulations based on this model were used to derive predictions and suggest how the 
model may account for extant data. Further research is needed to test predictions from the model, as well as to 
generalize the model to account for a wider range of results and measures, but it is hoped that the model may 
serve as the foundation of a more comprehensive model of the development of executive function during 
childhood – one that addresses further age-related increases in the conscious control of behavior, such as those 




 Note that the model currently operates under the assumption that search behavior will be correct on all A 
trials, which is often, but not always the case. This assumption is advantageous as it allows for the experience 
on each A trial to contribute to both the habit and representational systems. Strictly speaking, however, 
incorrect A trials should disrupt (and perhaps weaken) the habit while still providing opportunity for reflection. 
Although this issue needs to be addressed to explain the wide range of possible behaviors, it does not impact on 
any of the major arguments presented in this article. Rather, the empirical investigations inspired by the model 




 DST does contend that distinctive covers may lead to a weaker habit, but only if this input encourages 
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